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Introduction Scottish reception of natural law.
The importance of the reception of natural jurisprudence in the
Scottish Enlightenment is generally appreciated. Early eighteenth-cen-
tury Scottish intellectuals tried to reform the universities by introducing
Pufendorf's natural jurisprudence by way of moral philosophy. The
problem was that Pufendorf detached theological and moral foundation
from his natural law, which consisted in the external regulation of
actions through self-love; so that his natural law had too many
Hobbesian implications of a materialistic view of human nature and
absolute monarchy to be accepted by the Presbyterian Church
established by the Revolution." So the Scots needed to modify his
jurisprudence by putting it on some proper theological and moral
foundations and making it applicable to the ideological defence of the
Revolution.
Carmichael put Pufendorfian natural law on the basis of natural
theology, finding internal motivation to respect natural rights not in the
fear of God whose arbitrary power became a sanction but in the love
of God by which everyone expressed his aspiration for beatitude.2' While
Pufendorf's theory of limited sovereignty was ambiguous as he
propounded non-resistance to sovereigns, Carmichael vindicated the
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people's right of resistance, allowing them the judgement of govern-
ment's abuse of power.31
Hutcheson's moral philosophy can be read as a next attempt to
adopt Pufendorf to the Scottish intellectual and political situations. He
tried to replace selfish human nature of Augustinism with natural
sociability on which to found an empirical theory of natural law. His
challenge to Augustinism involved the reform of orthodox Presbyterian
theology and education.4'
But there were other European thinkers than natural lawyers
whose relations with Hutcheson needs research. This essay is intended
to uncover Malebranche's languages in Hutcheson's moral philosophy.
They were surely among languages available for Hutcheson in his
attempt to de-Hobbize Pufendorfian moral science by finding moral
principles in the passions themselves and rejecting absolutism.
Malebranche's idea of the divine general will was opposed to Hobbism,
and he mitigated Augustinian views of human nature. I want to
consider Hutcheson's reception of Malebranchean ideas of the general
will, passions and society, and the divine order and relations of
perfection. In addition to connecting the two thinkers directly, I also
want to examine the passive obedience controversy in 1710's Britain
and Ireland in which Malebranchean terms of generality were applied
and individual faculty of moral perception was discussed. Chapter 1
outlines relevant aspects of Malebranche's thought: a critique of
Hobbism and some seminal ideas for Hutcheson. Chapter 2 looks at an
immediate context of the revolution/passive obedience controversy.
Chapter 3 interprets Hutcheson's moral theory of passions both as a
development of Malebranche's analysis of social passions and as a
－73（126）－
critique of his moral rationalism of achieving the divine order through
enlightened self-love. Chapter 4 connects Hutcheson's moral philosophy
to his politics in defence of the rights of private judgement and
resistance.
Chapter 1 Malebranche's moral theology: general
will and sociable passions
Malebranche's theology was a critique of Hobbesian voluntarism;
like Leibniz, he was a realist in thinking that God acts by the eternal
laws of justice. This prior reality of justice was explained in terms of
his central concept of the general will of God.5' He remarked that 'He
must act through general wills (des volontes generates), and thus
establish a constant and lawful order.'61The divine general will implies
impartial justice. God never acts through particular wills, which would
reveal the imperfection of His laws. Thus Malebranche rejected an
arbitrary absolute will. Extending Cartesian laws of nature which are
uniform, constant and simple, he saw God acting regularly through such
general laws not only in nature but in grace: 'Since it is the same God
who is the author of the order of grace and of that of nature (l'ordre
de la Grace & de celui de la Nature), it is necessary that these two
orders be in agreement with respect to everything they contain.'71
Malebranche's theology of the general will in grace is a critique of
Augustinian Jansenism and Calvinism as they assumed God's absolute
will in grace to fallen men. With generality of His wills,God's extensive
benevolence is emphasized. Malebranche intended 'to make God
loveable to men' and rejected 'a powerful and sovereign God' as 'un-
just, cruel and bizarre'.81
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While the divine general laws of nature are still empirical,
Malebranche proceeded beyond the empirical world to the rational
metaphysical world of the divine order and relations of perfection in his
search for the moral order, which was opposed to moral scepticism of
Hobbes for whom the only order was imposed artificially by the
sovereign power authorized by individuals. But both Hobbes and
Malebranche regarded human nature as not susceptible to the moral
order. Fallen human nature is too much connected to body to tend to
the true spiritual good, with senses, imaginations and passions serving
only for self-preservation. So reason with the help of grace of
delectation must overcome deceptive senses, imaginations and passions
to obtain the divine truth and order which we should love and partake
in: 'let everyone examine by the light of Reason and of faith the
passion which holds him captive, and he will at least find in himself
some desire to be delivered from its tyranny.'91Malebranche referred to
'the relations of perfection (les rapports de perfection)' as 'the
immutable Order which God consults when He acts, the Order which
also must govern the esteem and love of allintelligent beings.' In his
illustration we should esteem a coachman, a horse and a stone
according to their respective degree of perfection. As 'the relations of
perfection' are immutable like the mathematical relations of magnitude,
he remarked, 'Truth, Falsehood, Justice and Injustice are real and exist
for all intelligent beings.'101His remarkable opposition of 'universal
Resaon (la Raison universelle)' and 'love of Order (l'amour de l'Ordre)'
to 'his own particular reason (sa raison particuliere)' and 'self-love
(l'amour propre)'111shows that particularity of human nature should be
transformed into generality for the moral achievement of the divine
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order.
In Malebranche Augustinian dichotomy of soul and body seems to
detach morality attained through reason and grace from corrupt human
nature of passions, and thereby to keep the eternal uniformity of
morality from scepticism. But remarkably he modified this dichotomy,
showing a possible path from passions to morality. In fact he denied
that sin corrupted completely and destroyed nature, and that senses
and passions themselves were entirely corrupted.131 First I want to turn
to his concept of 'enlightened self-love (l'amour propre eclaire)' by
which he tried to reconcile corrupt nature and moral grace. In his view
self-love is sufficiently neutralized as a general principle of the pursuit
of happiness to be redirected to solid spiritual happiness by reason and
grace so that 'enlightened self-love can sometimes halt or diminish the
movement of the passions.'14'Reason alone is not so strong as passions,
so he distinguished and opposed self-love and other passions. Self-love
can be enlightened into an effective motive towards the divine order of
virtue.
Malebranche discerned the socially useful constitution of passions,
though for him society was only for the exchanges of material goods
for preserving the body and social utilitynever constituted virtue which
must be sought for exclusively in the divine order above. He
appreciated the function of the passions in remarking 'the passions
which are very wisely established in relation to their proper end, which
is to gain the conservation of health and life, the union of man and
woman, society, commerce, the acquisition of sensible goods'.151 His
understanding of how the passions worked was based on his empirical
analysis of human nature which rather contrasted his metaphysics of
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the divine order and relations of perfection. He criticized the Stoics'
proud denial of passions, stating that 'itis ridiculous to philosophize
against experience.'16' His 'science of man (La science de l'homme)'17'
was concerned with the passions as they were and can be a model for
Scots' science of man. Malebranche was surely Hutcheson's forerunner
in moral psychology in observing how passions connected men as they
prompted them to interact on each other. The former's belief in man's
natural inclination for social utilityis not far away from the latter's
belief that natural affections constitute the base of social virtues. In
fact, Hutcheson concluded his 'Reflections upon Laughter', a critique of
Hobbes, by quoting with approval Malebranche's description of the
admirable contrivance of the passions and actions among men.181 Here
Malebranche explained how the passions were constituted to keep just
social order; in response to whether any other's action is 'just and
according to the rule of society', such a proper passion (e. g. compas-
sion, indignation, or derision) is produced as prompts us instinctively to
a necessary reaction.19'I suggest that this was a seminal idea for
Hutcheson as well as Smith. Hutcheson would also develop Malebran-
che's point about agreement of self-love and benevolence: 'these two
loves God has placed in us should uphold and strengthen one
another.'20'Finally it is to be noticed that Malebranche's analysis of the
passions is a part of his theology of the divine benevolence. He inferred
divine design from the sociable constitution of the passions: 'mecha-
nisms (les ressorts) and relations the Author of nature placed in the
brains of men and in all the animals to maintain the harmony and
union necessary for their preservation.'2" A similar connexion can be
found between Hutcheson's moral psychology and natural theology.
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Despite his insight into the sociabilityof the passions, Malebranche
stillremained basically within the limit of his contemporary French
moralists' analysis of self-love and society.22'His appreciation of the
passions was not a breakthrough as long as he regarded the purpose of
his 'science of man' as discovering 'corruption of our nature'.231In his
analysis of the passions he discovered no evidence of morally good,
that is virtuous, passions which correspond to the divine general will.
He just recognized the existence of 'particular passions' which
prevented us from experiencing joy at the thought of being a part of
the infinite thing.241So all the passions are equally far away from the
virtuous generality; they are all subservient to the bodily goods. Instead
of attributing morality to some passions, Malebranche seems to have
intended to see the passions' actions without moral consequences as he
remarked in opposition to Christian morality that pride and humility are
not a source of vice and virtue respectively.25'His extensive concept of
self-love as the general principle of happiness leads to the reduction of
virtue to self-love. When he observed that 'All men...have an
inclination towards virtue, knowledge, honours, and riches, and for the
reputation of possessing these advantages,'261 he considered virtue only
as an object of self-love or a means for the end of grandeur. While he
found most passions, including apparently anti-social ones, socially
beneficial and necessary, he did not identify some passions with virtue.
If we take generality and particularity as his fundamental opposites of
morals, generality consists in the divine will and order, and the passions
belong to the evil sphere of particularity.
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Chapter 2 Passive obedience controversy: general
rules and particular actions
Before I proceed from Malebranche to Hutcheson, I want to look
at a British and Irish controversy on the revolution around 1710's in
which Malebranchean languages of generality appeared frequently.
Ideological conflicts were shaking the Revolutionary settlement; Tory
and High Church challenged the Whig and Low Church resistance with
passive obedience, non-resistance. Charles Leslie propounded the theory
of divine right and passive obedience to criticize social contract and
resistance, and evoked the terrifying memory of the civil war by
imagining 'Fanaticks, Common-Wealth-Men' association of Whigs, the
Low Church, Dissenters and Scottish Presbyterians.2T> An Irish High
Church cleric, George Berkeley vindicated passive obedience on the
principle of natural law, and in his discourse I see what ideology
Malebranchean ideas of generality could be transmogrified into when
the divine general will is not associated with a man's moral judgement
of the general good. Malebranche himself was critical of English and
German Protestant princes because religious truths were above princes
for him.28'
Though not referring to Malebranche, Berkeley used the
Malebranchean language of generality to demonstrate the moral duty of
passive obedience. As Malebranche did in his theory of enlightened
self-love, Berkeley assumed self-love as 'a principle of all others the
most universal, and the most deeply engraven in our hearts' and argued
that self-love required us to obey the divine will and natural laws if we
want to enjoy eternal happiness. He conducted an argument similar to
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Malebranche's argument about the general will to discover the end of
the natural laws: because of God's infinite goodness the end is not 'the
private good of this or that man, nation, or age, but the general
well-being of all men, of all nations, of all ages of the world'.291 Then
he contrasted two methods of achieving the end of the general good:
Either, first, without the injunction of any certain universal rules of
morality, only by obliging every one upon each particular occasion
to consult the public good, and always to do that which to him
shall seem, in the present time, and circumstances, most to
conduce to it. Or, secondly, by enjoining the observation of some
determinate, established laws, which, if universally practised, have,
from the nature of things, an essential fitness to procure the
well-being of mankind; though in their particular application they
are sometimes, through untoward accidents and the perverse
irregularity of human wills, the occasions of great sufferings and
misfortunes, it may be, to very many good men.301
These two methods of act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism
presumably reflect Malebranchean particularity and generality
respectively. Berkeley adopted the latter method of the general rules,
which he compared to the general laws of nature which God dose not
change despite any particular disaster.3" Berkeley's critique of the
former method of particular judgement seems relevant to Hutcheson's
moral sense theory. For Berkeley, an individual's private judgement
about the public good in particular cases is subjective, so unstable and
unable to reach public consensus, with the result that the moral
standard will collapse: 'the measure and rule of every good man's
actions is supposed to be nothing else but his own private disinterested
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opinion of what makes most for the public good at that juncture; ...
this opinion must unavoidably in differnet men, from their particular
views and circumstances, be very different'.32'Similarly remarkable is
his critique of benevolence as destructive of the general rule of justice:
'they [Tenderness and benevolence] are passions rooted in our nature,
and, like all other passions, must be restrained and kept under,
otherwise they may possibly betray us into as great enormities as any
other unbridled lust.'331The private judgement of the public good, or
benevolence, is a particular will whose partial arbitrariness causes
moral confusion and social dissolution. Berkeley's two methods lead us
back to the Malebranchean problem of the general laws and the
particular passions. The passions prevent the private judgement from
reaching the general good: 'we must, if I may so say, go out of it, and
imagine ourselves to be distant spectators of all that is transacted and
contained in it; otherwise we are sure to be deceived by the too near
view of the little present interests of ourselves, our friends, or our
country.'341This partial particularity of our passions and interests is the
reason for his distinction between the reasoning of natural law by the
public good and 'the ordinary moral action of our lives' by natural
law.35' Natural law should govern absolutely the particular cases in
which we are necessarily too much involved in the immediate interests
to become distant spectators. By this distinction Berkeley could make
natural law absolutely authoritative beyond the private judgement
about the public good in ordinary life.
Berkeley deduced the moral obligation of passive obedience from
the necessity of the general rules. If his view of private judgement is
accepted, it seemingly follows that, as he argued, Hobbesian state of
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nature caused by moral confusion must be overcome by a sovereign's
fiat, which is questioned or resisted at the risk of recurrent confusion,
so that passive obedience is requried as an absolute moral duty. But it
is strange that a sovereign's absolute will proceeds from the general
rule theory. In Malebranche God's will was general, whereas here a
sovereign's will is never general. While proposing the general rule,
Berkeley brought in Hobbism through the back door as he could not
have recourse to God in the secular politics. The secular politics
different from absolutism will be possible if a different view of moral
faculty of passions is taken.
Among critics of the passive obedience doctrine was Molesworth,
who defended the Revolution and the mixed constitution as his
political principles of a 'Commonwealth Men' and 'Real Whig'.36' By his
constitutional histories of Denmark and France, he warned the British
public that absolute monarchy could be introduced into their free
country. An important factor of tyranny was clergy's seizing education
of the youth, and promoting spiritual slavery not only in Catholic but
Protestant countries. Instead of a blind obedience to the authority, civic
education of the young elites should teach 'good Principles, Morals, the
Improvement of Reason, the love of Justice, the value of Liberty, the
duty owing to one's County and the Laws'.37' Politicalliberty, religious
toleration, and civic education were connected aims of Molesworth's
republican politics. His agenda for the reform of the Scottish
universities for virtue and liberty formed a practical intention of
Hutcheson's moral philosophy produced in the Molesworth circle in
1720's Dublin.38'
Molesworth influenced young Scottish intellectuals who formed the
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Rankenian Club in Edinburgh around 1720. Interestingly, their legendary
correspondence with Berkeley on his philosophy suggests their contact
with another Irish thinker. Robert Wallace was a member of the club,
and I can find a critique of Berkeley's general rules in his account of
the act-utilitarian ethics inspired by Shaftesbury's virtue.391In his
unpublished short essay,401 he defined good actions as 'what tends in
some degree to the happiness of some being', and argued that we had
a faculty of moral perception as we either approve their moral beauty
immediately or judge their advantage and disadvantage by consideration
of their circumstances. So we should consider whether 'particular
actions' tend to the general happiness in their circumstances without
relying on the general rules. His rejection of the general rules is
explicit:
We first make a general rule that such an action is bad in
itself, and then by virtue of that rule once laid down conclude
there can be no circumstances can alter its nature: this certainly is
a wrong methods, for the only way to determine the goodness of
an action is to consider all the circumstances with which its
attended at that time its to be practised, and so find out its
advantages and disadvantages.
Discretion of diverse circumstances is lacking for the Malebran-
chean and Berkeleian approach of the general laws. Wallace's moral
realism made religion less essential for morals since moral goodness
exists before God's will, and we can perceive it on our own. His proof
of our moral faculty of approving good actions was applicable to a
critique of the passive obedience doctrine. In fact later he criticized the
doctrine in defence of the Revolution. He remarked that the restraint
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of power made it wiser 'to leave mankind to judge what is best,
according to the circumstances that shall actually happen.'411 His liberal
politicswas clearly based on his moral epistemology.
Chapter 3 Hutcheson on public passions and
general calm desires
Putting Hutcheson's reception of Malebranche in the political
context explored in the previous chapter throws some light on his
reasons for criticizing and developing Malebranche in the way he did.
He accepted Malebranche's proof of God's benevolence through the
empirical analysis of physical and human nature. But he refuted the
authoritative, exclusive tendencies implied in his vision of the absolute
divine order; the origin of virtue was ascribed to the given order on
which corrupt human nature depended. The general intention of his
moral philosophy as a response to Malebranche seems to lie in the
transformation of values by moving moral virtue from the divine order
to natural sociability and recognizing generality in the senses and
passions as well as in the divine will.The moral standard will be placed
not in some transcendental vision but in the private judgement, and
autonomous individuals will participate in forming the public good; thus
the moral faculty would be presented as the foundation for a liberal
concept of a polity.In short, Hutcheson's moral sense is essential for
his liberal theory of social contract. This is the main story of this and
next chapters. This chapter examines Malebranchean languages in
Hutcheson's natural theology, account of passions, and critique of moral
rationalism.
In his aesthetics, when Hutcheson induced God's design from the
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internal sense of beauty in uniformity, he relied heavily on Malebran-
chean languages. For example, proving the divine benevolence in the
constitution of the sense perceiving pleasure in regularity, which one
can master profitably by his limited understanding, he asked 'what
Reason might influence the Deity, whom no Diversity of Operation
could distract or weary, to chuse to operate by simplest Means and
general Laws', asserting that 'The universe must be governed, not by
paticular Wills, but by general Laws.'42> Unlike Malebranche, Hutcheson
examined the divine generality in nature in terms of a man's sense
perception. He was concerned with how generality was perceived by
the sense of a particular man. So generality might be said to be
particularized somehow; this is a significant change from Malebranche's
theology to Hutcheson's aesthetics.
Malebranche intended to discover the divine arrangement of the
passions. Hutcheson was following him when he observed that the
purpose of moral philosophy was to find 'natural connexion or order' in
'multipliticity of natural desires'.431 Hutcheson often referred to
Malebranche's subtle division of passions probably because he tried to
elaborate a more empirical moral theory of passions than his theory of
the moral sense, using the division. But the division seemed to
Hutcheson to overlook 'some of the most important distinction of selfish
and public passions'.44'As Moore says, Hutcheson tried to 'rewrite the
subtle Augustinian psychology of Malebranche'.451 Opposed to reduction
of every passion to self-love, he identified as sui generis the moral
sense, the public sense, the sense of honour, and the desires
corresponding to each in order to prove the reality of natural
benevolence. Thus his first move was to place the moral princple
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directly in some passions themselves.
Then Hutcheson proposed an amoral, hard-headed approach to the
passions: a mechanism in which the various passions, both selfish and
public, check and balance each other.461 He further admitted the
usefulness and necessity of every passion as complementary to our
imperfect intellect. For example, anger prevents any others' self-love
from committing injury.47' But this is not a purely mechanistic
approach; it has a foundation in his theological assumption of universal
harmony between each passion and the general good. He remarked,
'how admirably our Affections are contrived for good in the whole. ...
by them each particular Agent is made, in a great measure, subservi-
ent to the good of the whole. Mankind are thus insensibly link'd
together, and make one great System, by an invisible Union, ...we are
formed with a view to a general good End.'481Here he seems to place
the moral principle of generality in particular passions by connecting
Malebranche's two languages of generality and of passions. We do not
have to impose the principle of generality through reason and grace,
but we should let each passion act for the general good.
The fact, however, that the public passions can be destructively
partial belies this assumed harmony among the passions. So Hutcheson
introduced reason into his account of passions, and distinguished
between 'general calm Desires' and 'particular Passions'.491The former
allows reason to attend to the effects and circumstances of actions and
suspend them; these functions of reason correspond to Malebranche's
strength and freedom of the mind. Reason overcomes passions' 'partial
view of Publick Good' to apprehend 'extensive impartial Schemes of
publick Happiness'.501 Generality consists in reason, not in passions, so
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the term 'general desires' might be incorrect, but it surely vindicates
the private judgement of the public good in contrast with Malebran-
che's divine general will and Berkeley's general rules. 'General desires'
require a constant discipline of passions; 'particular passions' caused by
opinion, education, custom, the association of ideas need to be
eradicated.511 The inclusion of education here suggests Molesworth
circle'sagenda of university reform. The contemporary polite journalism
of Addison was popularizing moral improvement through polite society
and conversation by removing prejudice. Hutcheson referred to the rise
of 'general desires' through such social education where 'the Specta-
tors, who are disengaged from our partial attachment' make us feel
shame and remorse for our partiality,52'but his main emphasis was on
the cultivation of the perfect virtue of universal benevolence through
civic education. In response to Malebranchean generality, Hutcheson's
account of passions seems to contain two divergent approaches: natural
affections towards the general good in the divine contrivance of human
nature; and general desires requiring reason and civic education.
Does Hutcheson's adoption of reason mean abandoning his attempt
to find moral content in our senses and passions? Yet his point is that
a rational view of the whole system is the perfect form of virtue, not
the essence of it. Virtue exists in natural affections even if without the
general view. His critique of Malebranchean moral rationalism revealed
the irrelevancy of truth and relations without the moral sense and
affections being presupposed, and vindicated the moral independence of
particular affections and actions; he denied that 'in each kind Action
Men do form the abstract conception of all Mankind, or the System of
Rationals.'53'As in Christian ethics common reason moves our soul from
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our fallen nature to God, so in Malebranche relations of perfection
required our love of God as the essential virtue, and this was the view-
adopted by Carmichael. So it is significant that Hutcheson reduced the
love of God to a mere additional motive to virtue, stating that 'When a
Person therefore not thinking at present of the Deity, or of a
Community or System, does a beneficient Action from particular Love,
he evidences Goodness of Temper.'541 We approve of his actions for his
good temper which naturally appears as a particular love. Hutcheson's
morals with this essential understanding demolish fanatic sacrifice of
particular goods for the deity or for the community. His conclusion is
also explicitly in favour of particularity: 'however we must look upon
that Temper as exceedingly imperfect, inconsistent, and partial, in
which Gratitude toward the universal Benefactor, Admiration and Love
of the supreme original Beauty, Perfection and Goodness, are not the
strongest and most prevalent Affections; yet particular Actions may be
innocent, nay virtuous.'55'Particular individuals can be virtuous without
submitting themselves to the deity or the community; their passions are
expected to be disciplined through spectatorial responses of approval
and disapproval of each other's actions. Because of his natural theology
of the whole system of the passions, Hutcheson could conceive the
moral autonomy of sociable particular persons without God's or the
community's dictation.
We might say that moral realism might tend to repress individuali-
ty by presupposing an authoritative order of God or the community, as
is suggested in Malebranche's account of virtue: 'Man must sacrifice
himself to attain to God,... perfection or virtue does not consist in
following the order of nature, but in submitting ourselves in all things
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providing the extensive view of the general good.60'
As human nature is thus capable of morality and justice, it would
be a steady basis for liberal politics. There would be no occasion for
coercion. Both Pufendorf's positivism of absolute sovereignty and
Malebranche's realism of eternal order shared self-love theory, on which
social order must be brought in from the outside by repression or
manipulation of self-love. Malebranche, finding people's moderated
desire for greatness making for the public good, suggested the art of
deceiving them by an imaginary abasement that consisted only in
civilities and speech.611 Hutcheson understood well this political
implication of self-love theory when he remarked that 'the Wisdom and
Goodness of the Author of our Nature is traduced, as if he had given
us the strongest Dispositions toward what he had in his Laws
prohibited; and directed us, by the Frame of our Nature, to the
meanest and most contemptible Pursuits; as if what all good Men have
represented as the Excellence of our Nature, were a Force or
Constraint put upon it by Art or Authority.'621His benevolence theory of
passions was intended to provide an account of human nature more
suitable to natural law so as to reduce an occasion of force or art and
also to render a consistent account of God's nature and grace.
Hutcheson proved natural sociability to remove absolutism of
self-love theory on which Pufendorfian theory of natural law was
founded. Furthermore he deduced natural rights and laws from the
moral sense. He simply claimed to deduce natural rights from the
moral sense. I have seen the moral sense approving our particular
affections even if without any rational care for the whole system; so
his ethics had two levels of morality: the essential goodness of temper
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and the perfect virtue of universal benevolence. A corresponding dual
structure seems to be found in his right theory. First notions of rights
arise from the moral sense: 'by our natural sense of right and wrong,
and our sympathy with others, we immediately approve any persons
procuring to himself or his friends any advantages which are not
hurtful to others, without any thought either about a law or the
general interest of all.'63>This priority of 'private appetites and desires'
seems to be the basis and purpose of his politics.But affections which
produce actions approved as natural rights actually cover some lower
natural desires and the disposition for the universal good as well as
particular benevolence, and the moral sense cannot perceive the first
two things. Neither can the moral sense perceive the rights of animals
which are not subjects of moral goodness. So Hutcheson proceeds to
his second argument that we need a rational judgement about the
general good for setting rights; desires and needs are examined in
terms of the common good of the whole system of universe before
they are admitted as rights.641God's right to moral government is
approved in this way by our moral sense and reason. His right is
derived from His justice, that is 'universal impartial Benevolence' to the
whole creatures.651It is not His will but the public good that makes us
feel obligation to His natural laws. Thus Hutcheson's conception of
natural rights and laws are embedded in the general good.
Hutcheson's natural right theory combined with his concepts of the
moral sense and the general good seems to have made an effective
response to the theoretical basis of High Church and Tory ideology of
passive obedience. The people with the moral sense and reason can
judge about the public good for themselves, and their equal natural
－55（144）－
rights are not so subversively subjective, but remain regulated by the
consideration of the public good. His moral theory provided substance
to his liberal politics.I do not claim that his discourse on the moral
sense was a factional pamphlet in the passive obedience controversy,
but that his reference to the controversy in his argument on the moral
sense66' shows his consciousness of the controversy while writing the
text and possibly of its relevance to the moral sense.
Among his unalienable rights is 'the Right of private Judgement,
or of our inward Sentiments'. This will be a principle of limitation and
formation of government. If this right is injured, the people choose to
exercise the ultimate restraint: the right of resistance. I have seen it
argued that Hutcheson's virtue put in the senses and passions is open
to the common people. That he examined morality in terms of the
moral sense shows his concern about epistemology of virtue. For him
the problem of virtue was that of moral perception and approbation. It
might be said, therefore, that the moral sense had a practical relevance
to the people's consent in his social contract theory. His pursuit not
only of virtue but of the ability to recognize virtue seems to support
his politicalidea that power is not due to a governor's superior virtue,
but to the people's consent. So his politicsis not so much dependent
on virtue of legislators as that of the people jealous of their natural
rights.
Hutcheson's modern liberal politics drawn mainly from his Inquiry
needs modification by ancient politics contained in his later university
texts, A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy and A System of
Moral Philosophy. His theory of natural rights was derived from the
moral sense's general view of the public good, so they included 'the
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general Rights of Human Society, or Mankind as a System' as well as
individuals' rights.67'Unlike natural affections, general benevolence need
to be cultivated by civic discipline. So it follows that the moral sense
which should restrict government, should be improved by government:
civil governors ought not only to secure the rights but 'to instillinto
the minds of their subjects the true sentiments of religion and
virtue'.681His advocating the duty of the sovereign to improve virtue
and manners through civil religion and censorial power seems to be at
odds with his vindication of 'free conversation and argument'69' from
our modern perspective even if he repeatedly assured that leading
should not be enforcement or persecution. But both civic institutions
and polite conversation had the same purpose of correcting partial
bigotry of opinions. As long as opinion and custom were opposed to
natural virtue in his moral realism, his politics needed the regulation of
public opinion. In fact, deists and radical Whigs invoked civilreligion as
well as polite conversation in their attack on High Church priestcraft.
Both Toland and Shaftesbury quoted Harrington to propose 'National
Religion' as the public leading compatible with toleration.70'Hutcheson
was connected through Molesworth to these republicans. Under the
influence of civic tradition Hutcheson changed Malebranchean
theological generality of the divine will into general benevolence
promoted by civic discipline.
Conclusion
I have set two contexts for Hutcheson's moral philosophy: the
seventeenth century European controversy between voluntarism and
realism caused by the reception of Hobbes; and the British and Irish
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controversy on passive obedience. In these controversies Hutcheson
found relevant languages to manipulate in order to adapt Pufendorfian
natural jurisprudence for Scottish moral philosophy by replacing its
absolutist voluntarism with natural sociability. I have shown that
Malebranche provided him with seminal languages for overcoming
Augustinianism: the languages of divine generality and sociable
passions. In short, Hutcheson reconciled these two languages. He
transferred Malebranchean theological generality down to our common
passions by discovering public passions and general calm desires. While
natural sociability reduces the occasion for law enforcement to
minimum, his moral sense theory formulates the private judgement of
the public good. By showing that natural law is derived from the moral
sense, he refuted Berkeleian general rules justifying passive obedience.
I have connected his moral and political thoughts, interpreting the
moral sense as an essential foundation of his liberal polity of the
popular natural rights and consent.711
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